The goal of this paper is to provide some new cooperative characterizations and optimality properties of competitive equilibria supported by non-linear prices. The general framework is that of economies whose commodity space is an ordered topological vector space which need not be a vector lattice. The central notion of equilibrium is the one of personalized equilibrium introduced by Aliprantis, Tourky and Yannelis (2001) . Following Herves-Beloso and Moreno-Garcia (2008), the veto power of the grand coalition is exploited in the original economy and in a suitable family of economies associated to the original one. The use of Aubin coalitions allows us to connect results with the arbitrage free condition due to non-linear supporting prices. The use of rational allocations allows us to dispense with Lyapunov convexity theorem. Applications are provided in connection with strategic market games and economies with asymmetric information.
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Introduction
This paper studies core and optimality properties of equilibria in models of economies with quite general commodity spaces represented by ordered topological vector spaces which need not be vector lattices. Our analysis has consequences in the case of finite as well as infinite dimensional commodity spaces. The competitive equilibrium notion refers to the one introduced by [9] in their theory of value under non-linear prices. Non-linear pricing systems are of interest for economic analysis in the presence of discrimination among agents, imperfect competition, progressive income tax tariffs, for general adverse selection problems or land markets (see, for example, the discussion in [13] ). A broad range of other applications has been provided by [9] , where the alternate theory of value arises naturally from a series of previous contributions in infinite dimensional equilibrium analysis.
It is due to Aliprantis and Brown [2] the new approach to the study of infinite dimensional equilibrium theory that saw its emergence at the beginning of the 1980's. In their paper they proposed Riesz dual pairs as a natural setting to represent commodity-price dualities. They addressed the main questions of existence and optimality of equilibria emphasizing the rich lattice theoretic structure that is shared by the prevalent models in economics. The relevance of the lattice structure in infinite dimensional equilibrium analysis was confirmed in the famous existence result given by Mas-Colell in [25] . However, this relevance was in some sense surprising as it was apparently in contrast with Debreu's remarks according to which the main questions of existence and optimality of equilibria could be answered, in the finite dimensional theory, using cones that are not necessarily lattice cones (see [14] ). These remarks, that concern the "coordinate free theory", have to be understood in infinite dimensional spaces in terms of a "vector lattice free analysis". Hence the contrast above implicitly motivates a series of relevant subsequent papers in which lattice requirements have been weakened (see [26] , [30] , [31] , [17] among the others). The common idea is to assume a topology on the vector lattice commodity space that is not necessarily locally solid but only locally convex. The dual space, interpreted as price space, is still required to be a vector sublattice of the order dual. As pointed out by [9] , one shortcoming of this large literature is that the existence of equilibrium allocations and welfare theorems are proved at the cost of assumptions on the agents consumption sets that preclude models where location matters and differential information economies in which the consumption sets may be very small. Moreover, the vector lattice structure on the commodity space precludes a rich class of models that arise naturally when there are constraints on disposal technologies (examples include waste discharge restrictions and pollution disposal, see [27] ).
In the contribution given by [9] , main reference for the present paper, the limitations of the lattice approach are addressed definitively: not only the topology of the vector lattice commodity space need not be locally solid, but also the lattice structure itself can be given up. This approach affords decentralization by means of generalized pricing systems. More precisely,
• the commodity space is simply an ordered vector space which needs not be a vector lattice;
• the existence and optimality of equilibria are proved supporting the relevant allocations by means of non-linear prices induced by personalized pricing systems.
The vector lattice free analysis gives back the standard Walrasian model of general 1 equilibrium whenever, for instance, the commodity space is a vector lattice and consumption sets coincide with the positive cone and has applications in finite as well as infinite dimensional commodity spaces. In [9] , [6] non-linear decentralization is motivated as arising, respectively, from a discriminatory price auction and from models of portfolio trading. In [7] , non-linear prices are reconsidered as elements of a lattice cone called the super order dual 1 , hence the theory with ordered vector spaces may be considered as basically not so different from the one with vector lattice commodity-price duality. Finally, in [3] , [4] necessary and sufficient conditions are given on the order structure of the commodity space for supporting prices to be linear. The aim of this paper is to establish some new cooperative characterizations of personalized equilibria, that is competitive equilibria supported by non-linear prices. Such characterizations arise naturally as motivated by the notion itself and are helpful for a deeper understanding of the non-linear approach to the competitive theory. In particular, we provide characterizations formulated in terms of the veto power of just one coalition, namely the grand coalition. This is done:
• in a family of economies associated to the original one, in which the initial endowment of agents is modified in a precise direction;
• in the original economy, provided that agents are allowed to participate in the grand coalition using only a share of their initial endowments.
This kind of characterizations is inspired by a regularity condition, characteristic of personalized equilibria when compared with classical Walrasian equilibria, called arbitrage free condition, imposed in relation to the arbitrage opportunity that is due non-linearity. The arbitrage free condition is interpreted in the paper as a coalition-based arbitrage free condition using coalitions in which agents may participate with an arbitrary share of their initial resources (Aubin coalitions). According to it, in a personalized equilibrium, agents in a coalition have no incentive to sell their total initial endowment to get a revenue that is greater than the revenue from each member's assigned bundle.
First we prove that personalized equilibria coincide, under standard assumptions, with Aubin core allocations, i.e. they are exactly those allocations that are stable with respect to Aubin coalitions improvements. Then, we concentrate on the veto power of the grand coalition adopting the veto mechanism introduced by [20] . The blocking power is exercised by the grand coalition in a family of new economies associated to the original one, once the relevant allocation x has been fixed. In each of them the total initial endowment is a path from the initial endowment e of the original economy to x. We prove that under properness and irreducibility assumptions, personalized equilibria are exactly robustly efficient allocations, that means allocations that cannot be blocked by the grand coalition in any of these economies.
A central ingredient of our analysis is represented by rational allocations. Rational allocations have been introduced by [9] as a "convexification"of the notions of individual rationality and Pareto optimality. As a further contribution of the paper, we point out that, interestingly, this convexification made directly on a set of allocations, makes us able to dispense with the use of the Lyapunov convexity theorem (clearly not valid in our infinite dimensional set up) 2 .
In a second step, we assume that the veto power of the grand coalition is exercised in the original economy. Of course we cannot expect that personalized equilibria coincide with Pareto optimal allocations. Hence we assume that the grand coalition is defined with reference to a larger set of individual shares of participation: we say that a Aubin coalition has full support if each trader takes part in the coalition with a non-zero share of his initial endowment (a share that is not necessarily equal to one). Of course the Aubin core is a subset of the core defined considering only coalitions with full support and, consequently, also personalized equilibria are stable with respect to this class of coalitions. Moreover, assuming properness and irreducibility, we show that personalized equilibria are exactly those allocations that cannot be blocked by coalitions with full support. Here, again, we use rational allocations as a central element of our analysis, in order to dispense with the use of Lyapunov convexity theorem.
In conclusion, the veto power of the grand coalition is enough to obtain personalized equilibria. Applications of our results are discussed in the last part of the paper. In particular, following [21] , we provide a strategic interpretation of personalized equilibria, as Nash equilibria of a game with only two players (subsection 5.1). Moreover, in subsection 5.2 we apply results to economies with asymmetric information furnishing a suitable interpretation of the weak fine core.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes some preliminary and general facts about ordered topological vector spaces. The model and the main equilibrium notions are introduced throughout Section 3. This Section includes the notions of blocking in connection with the grand coalition. The characterizations of personalized equilibria in terms of the veto exercised by the whole set of agents are proved in Section 4 (Theorem 4.1, Theorems 4.13 and 4.14). Section 5 is devoted to applications and the final section 6 prospects the case of non convex preferences.
General facts
L is assumed to be an ordered topological vector space 3 under a Hausdorff locally convex topology τ . Moreover, it will be assumed that order bounded intervals of L are (topologically) bounded sets and that the positive cone is generating i. e. L = L + − L + . 4 We use standard notation for the topological, order and algebraic duals of L. They are, respectively, L , L ∼ and L * and each a subset of the subsequent. Also, the values f (c) of real valued functions f over L are denoted by f · c.
For any index t ∈ T , let X t ⊆ L + be a nonempty closed convex cone. Then 0 ∈ X t . Moreover, for a finite T (in this case we use T also to denote the cardinality of T ) we have that Π t∈T X t is a closed convex cone of the suitable power of L.
Given a point c ∈ L + , the symbols x, y, z, ... are reserved for maps on T with x t ∈ X t (i.e. points of Π t∈T X t ) and such that t∈T x t ≤ c. Such maps form a set denoted by A c . Naturally the set A c is convex and therefore also closed in the weak topology (in the power L T ). Observe that
Set C to be the convex cone generated by all sets X t . One has that C = t∈T X t . Naturally, points of C are non-negative. Denote by M the linear subspace of L generated by C, i.e. 
The Model
We shall deal with exchange economies. The commodity space L is assumed to be an ordered topological vector space under a topology τ that is locally convex. Moreover, it will be assumed that order bounded intervals are (topologically) bounded sets and that the positive cone is generating i. e. L = L + − L + 5 . Let us denote by T a finite set of consumers. For any consumer t ∈ T , the initial endowment is e t > 0. It belongs to the consumption set X t ⊆ L + which is a closed convex cone. The total initial endowment is e and it belongs to C, the cone generated by all consumption sets.
Preferences of the individual t are given by means of a correspondence P t of the consumption set in itself. The set P t (x) represents the collection of elements in X t that are preferred to the bundle x ∈ X t (the "preferred to" set). Here are possible assumptions on preferences.
1. irreflexivity, namely any P t (x) does not contain x; 2. convexity of values; 3. strict monotonicity, i.e. x + y ∈ P t (x) whenever x, y ∈ X t and y = 0 4. any set P t (x) is open in X t 5. any "worse than" set P −1 t (x) := {z ∈ X t : x ∈ P t (z)} is open in X t with respect to the weak topology.
6. x ∈ P t (y) implies that y / ∈ P t (x) for each t ∈ T and x, y ∈ X t .
Naturally, when strict monotonicity holds, any set P t (x) is non-empty as it contains x + εe t for positive numbers ε. Consequently, also x ∈ P t (x) always holds true.
The set of above properties of the preference correspondence is denoted by (A1). Concerning hypothesis denoted in bold characters like (A1), (A2) etc, throughout the sequel, an explicit appeal to them will be made whenever they are used in obtaining results. Assumption (A1, 6.) will be explicitly used only in subsection 5.1, assumption (A1, 5.) only in connection with the existence of equilibria.
An assignment is, by definition, a map x on T with x t ∈ X t (i. e. a point in Π t∈T X t ). An assignment x is said to be an allocation if t∈T x t ≤ e (i.e. if feasibility is satisfied). Allocations form a set denoted by A or by A e to emphasize the role of vector e in the feasibility. The following compactness condition is introduced to guarantee the existence of relevant allocations: (A2): the set A is assumed to be weakly compact. Of course (A2) is satisfied under the hypothesis of weak compactness of the interval
Let us introduce a properness condition on preferences as in [9] . (A3): There is an allocation v, with v t > 0 for any t ∈ T , and a family of correspondences 6 (P t ) t∈T , each defined on X t and with values in L, such that
As it is usual, the properness-like assumption on preferences compensates for the possible lack of interior points in the positive cone of the commodity space, since it ensures that infinite dimensional separation theorems can be applied. Precisely, it gives a condition sufficient for the preferred set to be supported by a continuous linear functional. The condition contained in (A3) and adopted in [9] , is due to [31] . If the commodity space L is a vector lattice and preferences are complete preorderings on X t = L + , then it can be proved that Mas-Colell's ( [25] ) uniform properness condition is strictly stronger than (A3) (see also the extreme desirability condition in [32] ). Related conditions are given in [10] and [30] .
Properties of feasible allocations
We now introduce some well-known properties that a (feasible) allocation may satisfy. The following notions are price free, in the sense that they should be understood as intrinsic in the commodity space. The term coalition will be reserved to non empty subsets of the set T . 
a strong Edgeworth equilibrium (write
6 convex-valued is required if we are under the assumption (A1, 2.) of convexity of preferences 7 Same as f-core or fuzzy core. proof: Let us start with x / ∈ C A . Then a coalition S exists such that a map (α t , y t ) t∈S can be found with
Up to an obvious normalization, it is clear that the set (co t∈T [P t 
. We can write, by convexity, 0 ≥ z = t∈T λ t (z t −e t ) with z t ∈ P t (x t ) for all t and t∈T λ t = 1. Naturally we rewrite t∈T λ t z t ≤ t∈T λ t e t to understand that x / ∈ C A . 2
Competitive equilibria and generalized prices
We start introducing standard notions of valuation and competitive equilibria. Since at this stage prices are required to be linear, existence and optimality of equilibria are in general not guaranteed for infinite as well as finite dimensional commodity spaces, given the possibility that the ordering of the commodity space is not a lattice order 8 . Here are the Walrasian notions.
Definition 3.6.
An allocation x is a Walrasian
The alternate theory of value arises from a personalized pricing system defined as follows. We just refer to a family p = (p t ) t∈T of elements of L * (i.e. of linear functionals over L assigned to each trader) as a list of personalized price. A list of personalized price, as we have seen, gives rise to a value function ψ p : C → [0, ∞] that will be defined as the generalized price associated to the list. If a list of personalized prices is made of order bounded functionals (we say that it is order bounded), then the value function is real valued. In this case, the name generalized price for the value function is naturally motivated by property 4 in Proposition 2.1 or, when all consumption sets coincide with the positive cone L + and the Riesz decomposition property holds for L, by Remark 2.2. Then, following the interpretation given by [9] , in a first step a discriminating Walrasian auctioneer assigns to each (price-taking) consumer t a personal linear price p t . Given this list of prices, the value of the generalized price ψ p over a commodity bundle c, ψ p · c, is the highest possible value that it is attainable by decomposing the vector c ∈ C into a consumable family (y t ) t∈T of vectors and assuming that each agents t pays its own personal price p t . According to this, it is natural to say that an allocation x of the economy, given the personalized price p, is a maximizing allocation if the value ψ p · e is exactly achieved in x, namely ψ p · e := sup y∈Ae t∈T
We use the symbol A (max, p) to denote the set of maximizing allocations.
Remark 3.7. Notice that under the assumption of weak compactness of the set of allocations of the economy, assumption (A2), a maximizing allocation always exists when the personalized price is made of continuous functionals (we speak then of a continuous personalized price) due to weak continuity of the function
t∈T p t y t defined on L T . In other words: p ∈ (L ) T ⇒ A (max, p) = ∅. Also observe that x ∈ A (max, p) ⇒ ψ p · x t = p t · x t , ∀t ∈ T since
otherwise, by Proposition 2.1 (properties 5., 2. and 1.), one has
We say that the economy satisfies the consumption decomposability property, (A4), if it is true that A c + A d = A c+d whenever c and d are in the cone C.
Property (A4) relies on the consumption sets of the economy. Indeed if u ∈ A c+d , and therefore for the map u = (u t ) t∈T , one has
Moreover even if the Riesz decomposition property would ensure the right decomposition, without the solidity of consumption sets (A4) could fail.
The consumption decomposability property is related to the possibility of a generalized price to be a linear map. The base for such a statement is in Theorem 2.3 and Remark 2.4. We define now equilibria supported by non-linear prices, that is competitive equilibria naturally arising in our setting whose introduction is due to [9] . They turn out to be of interest for infinite as well as finite dimensional commodity spaces, leading to a broad range of economic applications. Definition 3.10. For an allocation x ∈ A, we say that it is a:
personalized valuation equilibrium if it exists an order bounded personalized price p
such that
personalized quasi-equilibrium if it exists an order bounded personalized price p such that (i), (ii) above hold and (iii) is replaced by
(iii) b ψ p · t∈T α t e t ≤ t∈T α t ψ p · x t , ∀α ∈ IR T + .
personalized equilibrium if it exists an order bounded personalized price p such that (i), (iii) b above hold and (ii) is replaced by
Condition (iii) is an arbitrage-free condition motivated by nonlinearity of prices. What is relevant in it is the ≤ sign since the reverse inequality holds due to: feasibility of x, monotonicity and superadditivity of the generalized price 9 . Clearly in the above definition 3. ⇒ 2. ⇒ 1. Moreover, if we denote by pVE p the set of allocations that are personalized valuation equilibria with respect to a list p, then it is trivially true that:
Let us denote now by pQE p and by pE p the sets of allocations that are, respectively, personalized quasi-equilibria and personalized equilibria with respect to the personalized price p. Sets of all allocations that are, respectively, personalized valuation equilibria, quasiequilibria and equilibria with respect to some personalized price p are pVE, pQE and pE. The irreducibility condition needed in this setting to convert quasi equilibria in equilibria supported by nonlinear prices (i.e. to show that 2. ⇒ 3.), looks as an assumption on decomposability of all initial endowments. We say that a vector 0 < c ∈ L + is decomposable if an always nonzero element of A c can be found. Let us introduce assumption (A5): All initial endowments are decomposable. 
Now by continuity take for any y ∈ P s (x s ) a number k ∈]0, 1[ such that ky ∈ P s (x s ) and apply assumption ( * ): The claim is therefore proved and to obtain (ii) b again take for any y ∈ P t (x t ) a number k ∈]0, 1[ such that ky ∈ P t (x t ) and apply assumption (ii): proof: It is just by assumption that q ∈ L + , q · e = 0, q · x t = q · e t , q · P t (x t ) > q · e t for all t ∈ T . Applying Proposition 2.1 to the family constantly equal to q, one has that 
Of course, one can also summarize the thesis (analogous to that of the second welfare theorem) of the above 
Notions of blocking
Reconsider the additional condition in the notion of personalized equilibrium denoted by (iii) b and called arbitrage free condition:
and observe that, due to the positive homogeneity of ψ p , it can be rewritten in the form
This remark allows us to interpret (iii) b as a coalition based arbitrage free condition. Indeed, define the set
and call: any element α in the set Σ an Aubin (or fuzzy) coalition, the set S α = {t ∈ T :
T is interpreted as a coalition in which agent t takes part employing only a share α t of is initial resources e t . Of course ordinary coalitions form a subset of Σ, since they can be identified with their characteristic functions.
Looking now at condition (iii) b above, it is clear that t∈T α t e t is the initial endowment of the Aubin coalition and the arbitrage free condition can be interpreted by saying that: under a personalized equilibrium allocation, Aubin coalitions have no nominal incentive to sell their total initial endowment to get a revenue that is greater than the revenue from each member's assigned bundle. Hence the personalized equilibrium notion implicitly contains a requirement of stability with respect to deviations of Aubin coalitions, in the sense that agents in a Aubin coalition have no incentive to deviate from their optimal choice in the generalized budget set 10 . Is the allocation also stable with respect to deviations when agents in the coalition are free to redistribute their initial endowments among theirself?
To answer to this question, we shall give or reinterpret in the following the blocking mechanisms and the corresponding cooperative notions of equilibria in terms of Aubin coalitions. ii) y t ∈ P t (x t ), for all t ∈ S α .
Once this is fixed, it is clear that the notion of Aubin core introduced in Definition 3.1 can be reconsidered from the perspective of Aubin coalitions: x ∈ C A is the same as saying that x cannot be blocked by an Aubin coalition. Since each agent t may participate to a coalition α employing only a share α t of his initial resources, the intuition behind is that a feasible allocation belongs to the Aubin core if it is not possible for agents to join such a coalition and to redistribute their initial endowment among themselves according to these shares letting each member obtain a strictly preferred bundle. The feasibility over the coalition has to account of these shares as it is expressed by the weighted sum in condition ii) 11 .
Similarly, if we take a finite set A = {α 1 , . . . , α R } of Aubin coalitions, we say that x is blocked by A if we can find assignments y 1 . . . , y R enjoying the following properties:
and Let us call A a generalized Aubin coalition for supporting the intuition that an agent t may join simultaneously several coalitions α 1 , . . . , α R by participating in each with a portion α r t of his resources. Once this is fixed, we can clearly say that x ∈ s C A is the same as saying that x cannot be blocked by any generalized coalition.
The main results in the paper aim to characterize personalized equilibria as the only allocations that are stable with respect to the veto power of the grand coalition (in the usual or Aubin sense). Personalized equilibria are strong Edgeworth equilibria (see [9, Lemma 7.4] , proved here as a combination of Propositions 3.4 and 3.17). Consequently, they are in the Aubin core and weakly Pareto optimal, that means stable with respect to improvements of the grand coalition, assuming that agents may employ a share or the whole initial endowment joining it. In general these inclusions do not end up in equivalences. So the veto power of the grand coalition is not enough to characterize competitive equilibria unless the veto mechanisms is modified in a suitable direction.
To show this, we shall deal with the blocking mechanism due to [20] , in which the veto is exercised by the grand coalition in a family of economies associated to the original one. The next definitions are formulated following their approach. Definition 3.19. Let x be a given assignment. We say that it is non-dominated when the grand coalition can't block it, i.e. A e ∩ Π t∈T P t (x t ) = ∅ (write x ∈ N D e ).
It is clear that wPO = N D e ∩ A e . We introduce now a notation. Fix maps y ∈ Π t∈T X t and α ∈ [0, 1] T then define the new assignment e(α, y) by means of e(α, y) t = α t e t + (1 − α t )y t .
The economy coincident with the original one except for the replacement of the initial endowment e by e(α, y) is just referred to as e(α, y) for simplicity. Obviously e(1, y) = e and e(0, y) is the economy that has y as initial endowment. The economies e(α, y) describe a path connecting these two.
Call robustly efficient (write x ∈ RoEf ) a feasible allocation x that is non dominated in each economy e(α, x), i.e. an allocation for which A e(α,x) ∩ Π t∈T P t (x t ) = ∅ for all α ∈ 
Further properties and characterizations of personalized equilibria
We are going to show in this section that personalized equilibria can be characterized in terms of the veto power of the grand coalition. This will be done under two different approaches. In subsection 4.1 we will see that personalized equilibria coincide with robustly efficient allocations, that is they are robust with respect to the veto power exercised in each of the auxiliary economy in which the initial endowment is modified in a precise direction. Then, in subsection 4.2, it will be proved that personalized equilibria are exactly those allocations that cannot be f-blocked by the grand coalition. In both cases, the central element of our analysis will be represented by the class of rational allocations.
Personalized equilibria and robust efficiency
The main aim in this section is to show that personalized equilibria coincide with robustly efficient allocations. This characterization has been introduced for competitive equilibria of finite dimensional economies by [20] . There the proof relies on the use of Vind's theorem about the measure of blocking coalitions in suitable atomless economies, that in its turn applies the Lyapunov convexity theorem. To extend the result to infinite dimensional economies we proceed first proving that Aubin core allocations are robustly efficient. Then we show that robustly efficient allocations belong to the class of rational allocations. Rational allocations have been introduce by [9] as a "convexification"of the notions of individual rationality and Pareto optimality. They turn out to have a central role even in our analysis. Then we use the equivalence between personalized equilibria and rational allocations to prove our result. Notice that by means of rational allocations and properness assumption, we can dispense with the use of Lyapunov convexity theorem and Vind's result.
Theorem 4.1. Assume preferences are irreflexive, convex-valued, strictly monotone and continuous, i.e. (A1,1., 2., 3. and 4.). Assume further that (A3) (the properness condition) and (A5) hold. Take x to be an allocation, i.e. x ∈ A e . Then x is a personalized equilibrium if and only if it is robustly efficient i.e.
pE = RoEf.
The proof will be given in several steps Up to a normalization factor, the function β equals to 1 outside S and to 1 + α over S is a fuzzy coalition and we see now that it blocks the allocation x so that we have proved
N D e(α,x) .
Fix ε ∈]0, 1[ such that 1 − α t < ε and also (by (A1, 4.)) εy t ∈ P t (x t ), ∀t ∈ S. Observe the following y t + α t x t = εy t + α t x t + (1 − ε)y t = εy t + α t z t once we set x t + 1−ε αt y t =: z t ∈ P t (x t ) because of assumption (A1, 3.). Also note that
and that 1 1+αt εy t + αt 1+αt z t =: w t ∈ P t (x t ) by assumption (A1, 2.). It is now clear by ( ) that the fuzzy coalition β blocks via the assignment w that outside S coincide with y. 2
As consequence of Theorem 4.2, since personalized equilibria are in the Aubin core, we obtain the first inclusion.
Proposition 4.3. Assume convexity (A1, 2.), strict monotonicity (A1, 3.) and continuity (A1, 4.) of preferences. Take x to be a personalized equilibrium. Then x is robustly efficient, i.e.
pE ⊆ RoEf.
To fully characterize personalized equilibria as robustly efficient allocations, we introduce the notion of rational allocations, a class of allocations isolated by [9] . Some notation helpful to define them now follows. By L we mean the class of functions x : T → L such that all values sum no more than e, the total initial endowment. Clearly such set is nonempty, closed and convex and contains A. By θ t we denote the indicator function of the singleton {t}, therefore θ s x := x + θ s (e s − x s ) coincides, given the map x, with x everywhere on T but s, where the value is e s , the initial endowment of agent s. Now, given an allocation x, set
The above set is trivially convex and closed, naturally contains A. A map y ∈ Z(x) means both that y t ∈ X t for all t and that y ∈ co (L ∪ {θ t x : t ∈ T }).
Definition 4.4. An allocation x is said to be rational if
Naturally, the defining equality can be written as:
We may refer to rational allocations also as rational equilibria and denote the class of all of them by RA.
Remark 4.5. Notice that: RA ⊆ wPO. Indeed Z(x) includes A and A∩ Π t∈T P t (x t ) = ∅ is the weak optimality of an allocation x.
We present below the main properties of rational allocations.
Proposition 4.6. ([9, Lemma 6.2]) If we assume strict monotonicity (A1, 3.) and continuity (A1, 4.) of preferences and (A5), then: RA ⊆ IR.
Remark 4.5 joint with Theorem 3.15 says that
of course under convexity, monotonicity of preferences and under properness (A3). The further properties enjoyed by rational allocations with respect to weakly Pareto optimal, namely that disjoint from Π t∈T P t (x t ) is not just A but the bigger set Z(x), are mirrored in what follows.
Theorem 4.7. Assume preferences are convex-valued. Assume further that (A3) holds (the properness condition) and x ∈ RA.
A continuous personalized price p can be found such that
p t · x t ≤ p t · P t (x t ), ∀t ∈ T .
Assume further that preferences are strictly monotone, then the same p supports x as a personalized quasi equilibrium (i.e. RA ⊆ pQE). Moreover, x ∈ A (max, p) .
proof: Let x be a rational allocation. As in the proof of Theorem 3.15, a separating
is found. Since p separates a fortiori A from (Π t∈TPt (x t )) it remains only to prove condition (iii) b because all the rest was already proved in Theorem 3. 
By continuity assumption on preferences, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λz t ∈ P t (x t ) for all t ∈ T . Then, by obvious calculation, observing that
we get 
and also
where S denotes the set of traders t for which ρ t is not equal to one.
Define now u t = x t + ρ t (1 − ε) (1 − ρ t ) y t for those t ∈ S such that y t is not zero and u t = δ t x t ∈ P (x t ), when t ∈ S and y t = 0. 
Note that the proof of Theorem 4.1 is now achieved.
Personalized equilibria and coalitions with full support
In this section we concentrate on the veto power of the grand coalition. It will be exercised allowing all agents to take part in the coalition with a (non-zero) share of their endowment. This means that we shall concentrate on the set Σ f of coalitions with full support (i.e. the support is all of T ) defining a core, namely the set of allocations that cannot be f-blocked by the grand coalition, denoted by C A f . Naturally, C A ⊆ C A f . Our aim is to find mild conditions under which the equality holds true. Then, we will derive a characterization of personalized equilibria in terms of the blocking power of the grand coalition.
Lemma 4.12. Let us assume (A1, 4) and that the initial endowments e t , for all agents t, are o-units (or internal points). Then, given an allocation x /
∈ C A , a map α : T → [0, 1] and an assignment y exist with:
is an o-unit and, for all t ∈ S α , y t is an o-unit belonging to P t (x t ).
proof: First let us show that α and y exist such that S := S α (= support of α) = ∅, t∈T α t y t ≤ t∈T α t e t , and, for all t ∈ S, y t is an o-unit with y t ∈ P t (x t ). Note that, for this, we must only prove that the assignment y can be chosen with the property that y t is an o-unit ∀t ∈ S, the rest being simply the definition of the Aubin core.
Consider that εy t + (1 − ε)e t tends to y t as ε tends to 1, so, by continuity assumption, we can find ε ∈]0, 1[ with εy t + (1 − ε)e t ∈ P t (x t ) for all t ∈ S. Naturally, the inequality t∈T α t y t ≤ t∈T α t e t can be written as Now, to obtain that t∈T α t (e t − y t ) is an o-unit, assume t∈T α t y t ≤ t∈T α t e t , and, for all t ∈ S, y t ∈ P t (x t ), y t o-unit. It is then enough to take a positive ε with εy t ∈ P t (x t ) for all t ∈ S to have that t∈S α t y t − t∈S α t (εy t ) = t∈S α t y t (1 − ε) is an o-unit and therefore that even
Observe that in the above lemma, under the weaker assumption that all initial endowments are strictly positive vectors, then in the conclusion we can replace o-units by strictly positive vectors.
Theorem 4.13. Let us assume (A1, 3. and 4.) and that the initial endowments e t , for all agents t, are o-units (or internal points). Then, an allocation x /
∈ C A , can be f-blocked by the grand coalition or, in other words, can be blocked by a fuzzy coalition with full support. Consequently,
proof: An appeal to above Lemma 4.12 gives a blocking fuzzy coalition α with a support S. Let the vector v be an o-unit and such that v = t∈S α t e t − t∈S α t y t . Assuming that the support S is not full, for any t ∈ T \ S, monotonicity says that x t + e t ∈ P t (x t ) and choose, according to the definition of internal point, λ > 0 with v − λ t/ ∈S x t ∈ L + . Now modify α and y replacing, for t / ∈ S, α t by λ and y t by x t + e t . The modified fuzzy coalition α has full support and blocks x:
2
Order units of the commodity space L are precisely the internal points of L + . When L is also completely metrizable, then order units are precisely the interior points of L + ([9, Theorem 2.8]), and then for the validity of Theorem 4.13 we need to assume that L + has a non-empty interior. That non fuzzy core allocations can be f-blocked by the grand coalition even when the initial endowments are not necessarily internal points, is an achievement of next theorem. In this case, properness assumption is required and the role of the grand coalition is clarified also in connection with personalized equilibria. proof: Assume that x cannot be f-blocked by the grand coalition and that it is not rational. Following line by line the same proof of Theorem 4.10 we find that
where we can assume all ρ t ∈]0, 1] and y t ∈ P t (x t ), that means a contradiction. Since x is therefore rational, the conclusion now follows from Corollary 4.8. 2
Applications
In this section we provide some applications of our results on the veto power of the grand coalition. Subsection 5.1 provides a game theoretic approach to equilibria supported by non-linear prices, showing a characterization of personalized equilibria as Nash equilibria of a game with only two players. Subsection 5.2 applies our main results to differential information economies, offering an interpretation of the weak fine core.
Personalized equilibria and two-player games
Our aim in this section is to show that personalized equilibria of the economy coincide with Nash equilibria of a two-player game G. This result represents a first attempt to provide a strategic interpretation of competitive equilibia supported by non-linear prices. The characterization will follow from Theorem 4.14 and requires the introduction of a suitable game G. In presenting the game, we adapt to our general framework the main ideas in [21] . Contrary to usual strategic interpretation of competitive equilibria, the approach proposed by [21] does not consider money and prices. The game associated to the market economy is played by two players regardless of the number of agents. It will be referred as a society game because, according to the interpretation of [21] , the society plays the game in two different roles. The results of this section extend the main theorems in [21] to the case of infinite dimensional commodity spaces, allowing for non-linear prices supporting competitive allocations. Notice that when the personalized price become linear, for example if the commodity space is a vector lattice and the consumption sets coincide with the positive cone, the characterization result in [21] is extended to classical competitive equilibria. There are two players: the strategy set for player 1 coincides with the set of allocations that are non zero in each coordinate, i.e.
while the strategy set of player 2 is defined as
that is player 2 chooses a strategy in the set of allocations that are feasible in the Aubin sense, considering a strictly positive participation of each member of the society. Observe that S 1 and S 2 are non empty since they contain, respectively, the initial endowment allocation e and the pair (1, e) , where 1 denotes the characteristic function of the whole set T of traders. The set of strategy profiles is S = S 1 × S 2 , hence a strategy profile is s ≡ (x, α, y) ∈ S, where x ∈ S 1 is the strategy of player 1, (α, y) ∈ S 2 is the strategy of player 2. Let us denote by Π 1 : S → IR and Π 2 : S → IR the payoff functions for players 1 and 2, respectively.
We say that the game (G, Π 1 , Π 2 ) is a society game if it satisfies the following properties:
From the definition of a society game, some immediate consequences follow. 
proof: The first item is a consequence of assumption (A1, 6.) and of the properties G.2 and G.3 of the society game.
To prove the second statement, observe that if in a Nash equilibrium s * ≡ (x * , α * , y * ) the allocation x * / ∈ wPO, then there would exists z ∈ A such that z t ∈ P t (x * t ) for all t ∈ T . Assumptions (A1, 1.) and (A1, 6.) ensure that, if for a t ∈ T z t = 0, then x * t = 0 and x * t / ∈ P t (0) contrary to (A1, 3.). Hence z ∈ S 1 . Now from G.4, we have Π 1 (z, α * , y * ) > Π 1 (s * ) and a contradiction.
Let s ≡ (x, α, x) ∈ S and x ∈ wPO, by G.1 the payoff of player 1 in s is equal to zero. Assume then that Π(z, α, x) > 0 for an allocation z ∈ S 1 . Then by G.2 we have a contradiction.
The last statement simply follows by definition of S 2 and property G.
2
Hence a society game can be interpreted as a game in which the society plays in two different roles. As player 1, it chooses feasible allocations and tries to make Pareto improvements. As player 2, the society comes up with an alternative allocation trying to dominate the allocation proposed by 1. Theorem 5.1 tells us that player 1 has incentive to deviate whenever the selected strategy is not efficient. Player 2 has incentive to deviate whenever the strategy of player 1 can be dominated by the grand coalition. What we will see next is that in a Nash equilibrium the first player chooses a strategy that is efficient, while the second player forces the strategy of 1 to be competitive.
First we state the existence Theorem of a Nash equilibrium for a society game. satisfies (A1,1., 2., 3., 4. and 6.) . Assume further that (A3) and (A5) hold. Let (G, Π 1 , Π 2 ) be the associated society game.
If s
In particular,
proof: To prove the first implication, assume that x * / ∈ pE. Then by Theorem 4.14, x * / ∈ C A f and, by 4. of Proposition 5.1,
Conversely, assume that x * ∈ pE, and that for s * ≡ (x * , α * , y * ) ∈ S with Π 1 (s * ) = Π 2 (s * ) = 0, s * is not a Nash equilibrium. Then it may be the case that for some x ∈ S 1 , Π 1 (x, α * , y * ) > 0 = Π 1 (s * ). But then by G.2, x * / ∈ wPO and a contradiction. Or it may be the case that Π 2 (x * , α, y) > 0 = Π 2 (s * ) for some (α, y) ∈ S 2 . Then by G.3 x * / ∈ C A f and a contradiction follows from Theorem 4.14. 
for some continuous concave and strictly monotone utility function u t . Define the payoffs of players 1 and 2 as follows 12 Notice that x * t = 0 for a t ∈ T would imply, by monotonicity, that x * can be blocked by t and this contradicts the fact that x * belongs to C A 24
Economies with differential information
We introduce for a Differential Information Economy (DIE, for short) the notion of Aubin weak fine core in line with the notion of weak fine core introduced by [24] . Our aim is to show that the Aubin weak fine core coincides with the Aubin private core (see [19] and [22] ) of a suitable economy with symmetric information and therefore with the personalized equilibria of that economy. With respect to the analogous result proved by [15] , we consider a more general ordered topological vector space of contingent commodities. Moreover, we emphasize here the use of the previous full support results in order to overcome the unavailability of Lyapunov's Theorem.
For simplicity we consider a DIE in which the exogenous uncertainty is represented by a probability space (Ω, F, IP ), the finite set Ω collecting all possible states of nature and IP representing a strictly positive common prior. The private information of a trader t ∈ T is represented by a sub-algebra F t of F and it is assumed that F = ∨ t∈T F t . We assume that the space of physical commodities is an ordered topological vector space B as described in Section 3 and that B + has a non empty interior. We shall denote by L the product space L = B Ω . Utility that a trader t ∈ T derives from physical consumption is given by the real function u t (ω, v), with ω ∈ Ω and v ∈ B + . Standard assumptions on u t are that u t (ω, ·) are continuous, concave and (strictly) increasing. The same properties are then inherited by the (ex-ante) expected utility of the random consumption utility u t (ω, x(ω)). Such expected utility is denoted by U t (x), for each random bundle x ∈ L + .
For each trader t ∈ T , we shall denote by X t the set of random bundles that are measurable with respect to the private information of trader t, i.e.
X t = {x ∈ L + : x is measurable wrt F t }, a closed convex cone in L + . We complete the description of our DIE by defining the initial endowment as a profile (e t ) t∈T such that e t ∈ X t .
Notice that by introducing the correspondence x ∈ X t → P t (x) = {y ∈ L + : U t (y) > U t (x)} ∩ X t , DIE is a special case of an economy as given in Section 3. Consequently, we see that Aubin core as given in Definition 3.1 is identical to the Aubin private core as defined in [19] and [22] . "Private" since in the blocking mechanism agents in a blocking coalition don not share their private information.
It is natural to say that a list (p t ) t∈T ∈ (L ) T of continuous personalized prices is individually measurable if each p t is F t -measurable. The next notion is due to [9] .
Definition 5.5. An allocation x of DIE is said to be an individually measurable personalized equilibrium if there exists an individually measurable list of continuous prices
(p t ) t∈T ∈ (L + ) T supporting x
as a personalized equilibrium (see Definition 3.10).
According to [9] , in an individually measurable personalized equilibrium the auctioneer assigns to agents personalized prices in such a way that none of them may infer additional information from his individual price. The generalized price is the same for every trader and, since agents maximize their ex-ante utility functions subject to informational constraints, agents that are better informed will be in general better off. Following [9] and results of subsection 4.2 we derive. A notion of core in which agents in a blocking coalition share private information will be introduced below. It will be in the spirit of the so called weak fine core and therefore called Aubin weak fine core. For the rest of the present section we denote by (F i ) i∈I the finitely many distinct information partitions of Ω and we shall identify a partition with the information algebra it generates. The set T of agents can be naturally partitioned into finitely many subsets T i = {t ∈ T : F t = F i }. Set, for any group S of agents, I(S) to denote the subset of I made of those indices i for which 
Notice, in the above definition, the request of measurability of y t with respect to the joint information of members of the coalition. If x ∈ C A , the Aubin (private) core, then x t is F t -measurable and therefore also F-measurable as required in the definition above. However, a direct comparison between C A and C Awf is not possible since from the existence of a blocking y in the weak fine core sense, it does not follow that y blocks x in the private sense.
While private core is the appropriate core notion when agents have no access to any communication systems, the weak fine core is the appropriate notion of core when agents do have access to a communication system allowing them to fully share their information in a blocking coalition. We want to show now that the Aubin weak fine core of the DIE coincides with the Aubin (private) core of a suitable economy with symmetric information. The latter coincides with DIE except for the replacement of any F t with F. As a consequence, the weak fine core of DIE coincides with the set of personalized equilibria in the new economy. This result has been proved for large differential information economies with finitely many commodities by [15] with a proof that relies on the application of Vind's theorem (and therefore Lyapunov's). Denote by − C A the Aubin core of the symmetric economy in all equals to DIE except for the assumption that all agents have the same information F.
qt(ω) is defined by E[pt|Ft](ω) =
The inclusion − C A ⊆ C Awf is obvious, so let us show the converse. For that purpose, consider the complete information economy where, for each trader t ∈ T , the commodity space is B k + , the utility is the U t given above and the initial endowments e t are reconsidered through representatives in B k + . Let x ∈ C Awf and suppose x / ∈ − C A . The latter circumstance entails that there are γ and for any t ∈ S γ a y t ∈ X such that t∈Sγ γ t y t (ω) ≤ t∈Sγ γ t e t (ω), for all ω, and U t (y t ) > U t (x t ), for all t ∈ S γ .
Modulo the identifications described above, we have, in B k + : t∈Sγ γ t y t ≤ t∈Sγ γ t e t and U t (y t ) > U t (x t ), for all t ∈ S γ .
As a consequence of Theorem 4.13, the non fuzzy core allocation x can be blocked by a fuzzy coalition with full support, i. e. we can find for any trader t ∈ T a pair (α t , z t ) ∈]0, 1] × L k + with t∈T α t z t ≤ t∈T α t e t and U t (z t ) > U t (x t ), for all t ∈ T . Going back to DIE, to see that our assumption x ∈ C Awf is violated by the fuzzy coalition α and assignment (z t ) t∈T is enough to observe that trivially I(S α ) = I. 2
Our final result guarantees that the weak fine core coincide with personalized equilibria. Hence, while the Aubin private core coincides with the set of personalized equilibria, and then it rewards the information advantage of a trader, in a weak fine core allocation, the information advantage is worthless. Theorem 5.9. Assume that the total initial endowment e = t∈T e t is interior to the positive cone and that a number k > 0 exists such that e ≤ ke t for all t ∈ T . Then, the Aubin weak fine core of DIE coincides with individually measurable personalized equilibria of the economy in all equals to DIE except for the assumption that all agents have the same information F t := F.
proof: Let x ∈ C Awf and suppose x is not an individually measurable personalized equilibrium. By Theorem 4.14 and Proposition 5.6, x / ∈ −C A . Then as in the proof of Theorem 5.8 we get a contradiction. 2
Final remarks
Our final remarks deal with the possible extension of core equivalences presented in this paper to the case of non-convex economies. Again the central element is represented by rational allocations, even if slightly modified. This class will be related to strong Aubin core allocations. The use of the strong Aubin core to characterize competitive allocations in the presence of non-convex preferences is due to [23] and to [18] in Banach lattice commodity spaces. A possible approach to cover the case in which assumption (A1, 2.) is not fulfilled follows. Remind, from subsections 3.1 and 3.2 , that the inclusions pE ⊆ s C A ⊆ s C E are valid in general. Now, the following holds true. Naturally, an allocation x for which the condition ( ) is true is a rational allocation and the above condition ( ) can be considered as defining rational allocations of an economy equals to the original one except for the replacement of the sets P t (x t ) by coP t (x t ).
To characterize personalized equilibria as strong Aubin core allocations, we consider the following stronger version of properness assumption: (A3) : There is an allocation v, with v t > 0 for any t ∈ T , and a family of convex correspondences (Q t ) t∈T , each defined on X t and with values in L, such that t ∈ T, x ∈ X t ⇒Q t (x) ∩ X t = co P t (x) and x + v t ∈ int(Q t (x)).
Theorem 6.2. Assume that the economy E (A1, 3. and 4.). Assume further that (A3)
and (A5) hold. Then pE = s C A = s C E .
proof: It is enough to show that an allocation x for which ( ) is true belongs to pE. Let x be such an allocation. Due to the above observation we just apply Corollary 4.8 replacing the sets P t (x t ) by coP t (x t ). To conclude, just note that personalized quasi-equilibria and equilibria do not change when we modify the original economy replacing preferences by their convex hull. Indeed,
as it can be seen by using properties of ψ p . 2 A natural question arises whether a suitable properness condition required directly on the preferences P t (x) implies a condition like (A3) . For example, if this is the case in the properness assumption formulated in [18] for non-convex preferences (the commodity space is a Banach lattice and prices are linear) or in the uniform monotonicity assumption for non-convex preferences required in [13] (the commodity space is an ordered topological vector space and prices are superadditive). Finally, for a study of non-linear prices in non-convex economies with the tools of variational analysis, we refer to [28] .
